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now, as a precautionary measure, advise their clients of the risks that could result from their
business decisions.
This precautionary measure has not typically been a routine legal service. If the duty was
not a routine legal service, then it could create an aiding and abetting problem. However, certain
routine legal services do not amount to substantially assisting in a claim for aiding and abetting
in a breach of fiduciary duty and this duty can still be considered routine legal services because if
attorneys do not advise of these risks they could potentially be subject to a legal malpractice
claim. In Abrams v. McGuireWoods, LLP, the court had to determine if the defendant law firm
substantially assisted in a breach of fiduciary duty which ultimately led to bankruptcy. 4 The court
determined that the law firm did not aid and abet the managers because the lawyers did not do
“something more than the provision of routine professional services.”5 However, if the services
the law firm provided were more than routine legal services, there could be a possible cause of
action for aiding and abetting.6
Part I of this article discusses the legal duty lawyers have to their clients to advise them
of the legal risks and alternatives in connection with business transactions. Part II explains
potential risks faced by lawyers in advising clients and describes what typically would not
constitute substantially assisting in a breach of fiduciary duty under a claim for aiding and
abetting. This article concludes that law firms should take precautionary measures to advise their
clients of the risks that may result from a business transaction, and make sure their clients

4

518 B.R. 491 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
Id. at 503 (citing Meridian Horizon Fund, LP v. KPMG (Cayman), 487 Fed. Appx. 636, 643 (2d Cir. 2012))
6
Id.; Abrams v. DLA Piper (US) LLP, 2014 WL 3361802, *7 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2014) (holding that “the plaintiff
crafted claims that are plausibly supported with specific allegations regarding the relationships and transactions
between various entities involved. . . does not warrant dismissal at this stage of the proceedings”).
5
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understand the law in order to avoid disciplinary measures, such as legal malpractice, against
them.
Discussion
I.

Lawyer’s Duty to Advise

Universally, courts have recognized that lawyers are not business consultants and thus do not
owe a duty to protect their clients from making poor business choices.7 “Lawyers have an
obligation to exercise reasonable care only with respect to their legal advice.”8 One of the
reasons courts have generally not held attorneys liable for failing to provide business advice is
because they lack the knowledge required to give business advice.9 If a business wants advice on
whether to go forward with a business transaction, they should consult a business-consulting
firm. A business firm has the requisite knowledge to be able to provide reasonable and
professional business advice, unlike a law firm.
A. Lawyers’ Duty to Advise Pre- Peterson v. Katten
Prior to the decision in Peterson v. Katten,10 courts made the distinction between legal and
business advice, demonstrating that although the line can sometimes be grey, both do not
overlap. In Abrams v. DLA Piper (US) LLP,11 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana stated, “attorney client relationships do not include business advice given to
the Debtors. Rather the lawyers had obligations to exercise reasonable care only with respect to
their legal advice.”12 The court concluded that legal advice and business advice were not the

7

Abrams v. DLA Piper (US) LLP., 2013 WL 2634767, *6 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2013) (holding that a law firm is not
liable based on failure to provide business advice).
8
Id. at *8 (quoting In re Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp., 333 B.R. 506, 529 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2005)).
9
Id.
10
792 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2015).
11
2013 WL 2634767 (N.D. Ind. June 12, 2013).
12
Id. at *8
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same; business advice was not included in the services that come with an attorney client
relationship.13 In circumstances where failure to consider alternative options to the business
decision could lead to adverse consequences, the court stated that lawyers should provide advice
on the alternatives.14 While clients need to understand the risks with business transactions, the
court only extended the obligation to advise on the alternatives where there could be adverse
consequences.15 The clients would have to demonstrate that they would have reasonably acted
differently in their ultimate decision if they received the advice than if they were not provided
the risks. 16
Many courts have further held that if a debtor assumes the risk then they are just as much at
fault for the results.17 When the debtors assume the risk, they cannot bring a valid legal
malpractice claim against their lawyers.18 In Behrens v. Wedmore, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota defined the standard to determine if a debtor had assumed the risk of one’s own loss as:
“a person must know that danger exists, appreciate the character of the danger and voluntarily
accept such risk by having sufficient amount of time, knowledge, and experience to make an
intelligent choice.”19 Many businesses have the necessary amount of knowledge and experience
to make an intelligent choice without the advice of someone else. This is due to their experience
over the years making business decisions. After a certain amount of years, businesses should be
able to determine if the investment could potentially be a poor business decision. Businesses,
even knowing the risks, still go through with the business transaction in the hope that it will

13

Id.
Id. at *9 (quoting In re JTS Corp., 305 B.R. 529, 552 (Bank. N.D. Cal. 2003)).
15
See id.
16
Id.
17
See Behrens v. Wedmore, 698 N.W.2d 555, 572–73 (S.D. 2005); Peterson v. Winston & Strawn LLP, 729 F.3d
750 (7th Cir. 2013).
18
See Behrens, 698 N.W.2d at 572–73.
19
Id.
14
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successfully benefit the company. The gains could be worth the risk. But if they are going to take
the risk, then they have to assume the responsibility for their actions and cannot blame attorneys
for failing to give business advice.20 As stated above, lawyers are not business consultants and
thus it would not be fair to hold them responsible for their clients’ assumption of the risks.21
Courts have referred to this defense as in pari delicto.22 In pari delicto states that when the
client, in many cases the debtor, is just as much at fault for knowing the poor business situation
then there cannot be a valid legal malpractice claim.23 Businesses that have the knowledge to
make their own business decisions should have known the risks of the poor business situation
and thus cannot pass the blame to someone else, especially when it is an attorney who does not
have the proper business knowledge to give such advice in the first place. To this extent, debtors
have to assume responsibilities for their business decisions.
B. Duty to advise clients after Peterson v. Katten
The Seventh Circuit in Peterson v. Katten decided not to extend the holdings from several of
the other courts stated above with regard to this issue.24 The court acknowledged that lawyers are
not business consultants, yet still extended the lawyer’s duty to include the duty to advise clients
on the risks and different legal options concerning business decisions, whether or not it would
have an adverse consequence.25 The Seventh Circuit did not stick to a bright line rule between
business and legal advice.26 The court described the duties as overlapping and interrelated to

20

See id.
See Abrams v. DLA Piper (US) LLP, supra n. 9.
22
See Peterson v. Winston & Strawn LLP., 729 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2013).
23
Id.
24
Compare Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., 792 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2015) with DLA Piper, 2013 WL
2634767, and also with Behrens v. Wedmore, 698 N.W.2d 555 (S.D. 2005).
25
See Katten, 792 F.3d at 793.
26
See id. at 791–93.
21
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each other.27 It is important to acknowledge, however, that the court was not holding the law
firm liable for failing to give business advice.28 The law firm was held liable for “failing to
inform its clients of the different legal forms that are available to carry out the business and how
risks differ with different legal forms.”29 The Seventh Circuit wanted to make sure that lawyers
were at least advising their clients of the risks even if the clients have the requisite knowledge of
business decisions which should have made them aware of the risks.30
Clients do not have to take the advice of their attorneys, but attorneys need to advise them.31
For example, if the lawyers advised the clients of the risks but the client decided to take the risk
and it resulted in a Ponzi scheme that led to bankruptcy, the law firm cannot be held liable. Law
firms cannot be held responsible for client’s poor business choices when they were informed of
the legal risks and alternatives.32 In Peterson v. Katten, the court held that the law firm should
have known that the end result of entering into a potential Ponzi scheme was bankruptcy.33
There, it was alleged that the attorneys “did not recognize the risk from the combination of no
contacts and no direct payments, plus the potential that all paperwork purporting transactions
with Costco had been forged.”34 The court found these indicators should have alerted any
competent transactions lawyer to the possibility of fraud.35 “Advising clients how best to
maintain security for their loans using legal devices is a vital part of a transactions lawyer’s

27

See id.
See Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., 792 F.3d 789, 791–93 (7th Cir. 2015).
29
Id. at 793.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., 792 F.3d 789, 791–93 (7th Cir. 2015).
33
See id. at 793.
34
Id. at 790. “There were two forms for the security for the Funds’ advances: paperwork showing inventory Petters
furnished and a lockbox bank account into which Costco would deposit its payments for the Funds. However,
Costco never actually put money into the account. All of the money came from a Petters entity. The setup left the
Funds at Petters’s mercy and Petters never actually had any dealings with Costco.” Id.
35
Id. at 791.
28
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job.”36 The court in Peterson held Katten should have explained to the Funds “how to structure
the transactions in a less risky way.”37 The transactions between the debtors and the defendant
who defrauded the debtors should have triggered to the lawyers that the process by which the
money was being transferred was possibly a Ponzi scheme and could result in bankruptcy. 38 As a
result, the court held that the law firm should have at least given the debtors advice on the legal
ramifications that would result from entering into a business transaction that was not favorable to
their clients.39
So far, this recent holding has only been used by the Seventh Circuit. The prior holdings,
however, are not far off from the reasoning in this case, and it is possible that other circuits will
follow this line of reasoning. In order to avoid the potential for legal malpractice claims in cases
where clients are entering into business decisions that are likely not favorable to clients, law
firms should follow the ruling set forth in Peterson v. Katten.40 It does not create a high burden
on law firms to give clients the legal advice on the risks and alternatives associated with their
business decisions. The advice given is in regards to the different legal forms that may be
associated with business transactions. The extent of business knowledge required by Peterson is
only to recognize if the transaction has the potential to be unfavorable and advise accordingly.
Law firms should advise on the possible legal outcomes that generally result from poor
business transactions, even if the firm does not have the requisite knowledge to know if the
decisions could be adverse to their client.41 Because the court in Peterson imposed this duty to
advise clients on potential legal ramifications, a transactional lawyer should provide their clients

36

Id. at 792.
See Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., 792 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2015).
38
See generally Peterson v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP., 792 F.3d 789.
39
See id. at 793.
40
See id. at 791–93.
41
See id.
37
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with the risks, even if they are not certain of what the business decision will definitely result in.42
For example, a client could make a poor business decision and either knowingly or unknowingly
enter into a Ponzi scheme.43 If an attorney becomes aware of a possible problem with the
security for advances, such as the no contact and no direct payment in Peterson, then the attorney
should advise the client of the legal risks associated with that business transaction.44 As part of
the services provided, lawyers can make clear that they are in no way providing business advice
as such is not a duty they owe to them. Although it is an extra step for lawyers to take, it would
be better to advise their clients of the risks then to possibly face a legal malpractice suit.
II.

Routine Legal Services Cannot Constitute the Substantial Assistance Required
For an Aiding and Abetting Claim

Law firms that advise or assist their client in breaching a fiduciary duty can be held liable for
aiding and abetting that breach of fiduciary duty.45 To state a claim for aiding and abetting a
party must show the following:
(1) The party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act which causes an
injury;
(2) The defendant must be regularly aware of his role as part of the overall or tortious
activity at the time that he provides the assistance;
(3) The defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation. 46
To determine if the assistance is enough to establish liability under aiding and abetting, the court
can consider the following five factors: (1) the nature of the act encouraged; (2) the amount of
assistance given by the defendant; (3) the presence or absence of the defendant at the time of the
tort; (4) the defendant’s relation to the other; and (5) the defendant’s state of mind.47

42

See id. at 793.
See id.
44
See id. at 790.
45
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
46
Abrams v. DLA Piper (US) LLP, 2014 WL 3361802, *7 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2014) (quoting Thornwood, Inc. v.
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 767 (III.App.Ct. 2003)).
47
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).
43
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When determining whether a lawyer has provided substantial assistance in the breach of
fiduciary duty, courts have decided that for the same policy reasons in prohibiting attorneys from
participating in a conspiracy with their clients, attorneys can be held liable for “knowingly and
substantially assisting clients in the commission of a tort.”48 The assistance must be substantial
in order to be considered aiding and abetting. Courts have held that substantial assistance “means
something more than the provision of routine professional services.”49 If the law firm provides
its routine legal services to the company, even if a breach of fiduciary duty happens to occur, the
firm cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting. The law firm has to have done something to
help and not just fail to prevent the breach from occurring.50 The kind of assistance required to
classify as substantial assistance must be “active or direct, rather than passive and indirect.”51
The Abrams v. McGuireWoods court held that there was no valid allegation that the firm,
McGuireWoods, did anything more than provide what is considered routine legal services.52 In
the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the firm substantially assisted the company’s managers
by “failing to take any steps to ensure Heartland received business advice, never advising
Heartland’s selling shareholder that they were breaching their fiduciary duties and not taking any
steps to protect Heartland from the breach.”53 However, the court ruled that this did not
constitute substantial assistance.54 The court acknowledged the importance of creating a
substantial assistance standard. “If the law were otherwise, it would be nearly impossible for an

Thornwood, 799 N.E.2d at 768. “One may not use his license to practice law as a shield to protect himself from
the consequences of his participation in an unlawful or illegal conspiracy.” Id.
49
Abrams v. McGuireWoods LLP, 518 B.R. 491, 503 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (citing Meridian Horizon Fund, LP v.
KPMG (Cayman), 487 Fed. Appx. 636, 643 (2d Cir. 2012)).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
McGuireWoods, 518 B.R. at 503.
53
Id. at 504.
54
Abrams v. McGuireWoods LLP, 518 B.R. 491, 504 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (stating that the inaction does not constitute
substantial assistance because “silence, inaction, or failure to investigate does not constitute substantial assistance”
(quoting El Camino Res., LTD. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 722 F.Supp.2d 875, 914 (W.D.Mich. 2002)).
48

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

attorney, no matter how scrupulous to avoid liability for a client’s misdeeds.”55 The
interpretation of “substantial assistance” was more restrictive on liability than expansive.56
It is important to note that not all jurisdictions follow this rule; some dissent from this
rule. In California, for example, the courts have held that “ordinary business transactions can
constitute substantial assistance so long as the aider and abettor knows the services will help
their client commit the breach.”57 In McGuireWoods, Indiana had not decided the issue before,
so the court decided not to follow an expansive interpretation creating more liability. 58 New
York courts have held that it is insufficient to show substantial assistance when the law firm’s
acts “fall within the scope of their duties as counsel.”59 New York has expanded more on the
importance of the “knew or should have known” element for aiding and abetting.60 The courts in
New York have held that for actual knowledge, the fact that the lawyers should have known is
only enough for constructive knowledge not actual knowledge.61 To be sufficient, the plaintiffs
would have to demonstrate the lawyers knew or should have known coupled with specific
allegations of actual knowledge.62
In general, law firms that act within the scope of their employment and follow the duties
owed to their clients will not be found liable for aiding and abetting. In jurisdictions where even
ordinary business transactions can constitute substantial assistance, law firms need to be aware
that there is a chance of being held liable for aiding and abetting if they have actual knowledge

55

Id.
Id.
57
See Casey v. U.S. National Bank Ass’n, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, 406 (2005).
58
Abrams v. McGuireWoods LLP, 518 B.R. 491, 504 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
59
Lumen at White Plains, LLC v. Stern, 2016 WL 237578, *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 21, 2016). “Further, plaintiffs’
allegations that defendants failed to act are insufficient to show ‘substantial assistance,’ as plaintiffs do not
sufficiently allege that defendants had a duty to act to protect plaintiffs’ interests.” Id.
60
See Gregor v. Rossi, 120 A.D.3d 447, 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014).
61
See id.
62
See id. at 449 (quoting Weinberg v. Mendelow, 113 A.D.3d 485 (1st Dept. 2014)).
56
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that their services will help their clients commit a breach of duty. “Silence, inaction, or failure to
investigate does not constitute substantial assistance.”63 Further, knowing of a violation
combined with inaction is still not enough to constitute substantial assistance.64
In the case of transactional lawyers, a big part of the legal services provided is papering
the deal. As long as it is merely “papering the deal,” law firms will not encounter a substantial
assistance problem, even if the result does end in a breach of fiduciary duty.65 For example, in
Abrams v. McGuireWoods, the court held the firm merely papered the deal when it “performed
the legal work necessary to structure and document the merger and provided the legal services
necessary to negotiate and document the merger.”66 If a transactional law firm remains within
these types of services, necessary in any complicated transaction, then the lawyers’ actions will
not be enough to constitute a basis for liability.67
Conclusion
For law firms representing business corporations and clients involved in business
transactions, the firm needs to be especially aware of the duties they owe to their clients. This
expansion on their legal duty to clients presents a low burden to lawyers compared to the risks of
a legal malpractice claim. By simply advising of the risks, lawyers will avoid liability to every
client that will claim their poor business decision that resulted in bankruptcy was all at the fault
of their attorneys for not providing the risks. By giving advice of the risks it puts the client on
notice and if they decide to go through with the transaction which later causes bankruptcy, the
fault is on the client not the attorney. Because this duty to advise has become part of the routine

El Camino Res., LTD v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 722 F. Supp. 2d 875, 914 (W.D.Mich. 2002).
See Benford v. City of Minneapolis, 2012 WL 6200365, at *6 (D.Minn. Dec. 12, 2012).
65
See Abrams v. McGuireWoods LLP, 518 B.R. 491, 504 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
66
Id.
67
See id.
63
64
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legal services attorneys provide their clients, law firms do not have to worry that these actions
will constitute as “something more” for substantial assistance in connection with an aiding and
abetting claim. As long as attorneys are aware of their actions and properly following their duties
to clients, they will be able to avoid an aiding and abetting claim and a legal malpractice suit.
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